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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
THOMAS M. VIGIL, 
: Case No. 940614-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Priority No. 2 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ASK QUESTION 27 
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In response to Mr. Vigil's contention that the trial 
court erred in refusing to ask the prospective jurors requested 
voir dire question 27,x the State argues that this Court should 
not address the merits of the issue because Mr. Vigil has failed 
to provide legal authority in support of the question, and has 
failed to demonstrate how trial counsel was hampered in 
exercising peremptory and for cause challenges as a result of the 
trial court's failure to ask the question. State's brief at 20-
21. 
Question 27 stated, 
27. If, after hearing the evidence, you came to 
the conclusion that the prosecution had not proven the 
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and you 
found that a majority of the jurors believed the 
defendant was guilty, would you change your verdict 
only because you were in the'minority? 
(R. 709) . 
The legal authority demonstrating that the trial court 
should have asked the question is found on pages 13 through 14 of 
Mr. Vigil's opening brief. As noted on page 14 of the brief, 
UA11 that is necessary for a voir dire question to be appropriate 
is that it allow 'defense counsel to exercise peremptory 
challenges more intelligently.'" State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 
845 (Utah 1988)(citation omitted). 
Mr. Vigil's explanation of how the trial court's 
failure to ask the question hampered trial counsel's ability to 
exercise peremptory and for cause challenges appears on page 15 
of Mr. Vigil's opening brief. As noted on page 15 of the brief, 
the voir dire was inadequate in the absence of the trial court's 
asking question 27 because "the voir dire never addressed ... 
whether [the prospective jurors] would maintain their 
independence in the deliberation process, or succumb to pressure 
from the majority." 
The State argues on the merits regarding question 27 
that Mr. Vigil has failed to demonstrate that asking question 27 
would have revealed any biases. State's brief at 21. Mr.. Vigil 
has no burden to make such a showing. The question is not 
designed to address bias, but is designed to assess the jurors' 
ability to maintain independence in the face of peer pressure 
during jury deliberations. Under Worthen, the question would 
have assisted Mr. Vigil in exercising his peremptory and for 
cause challenges, and the trial court abused its discretion in 
failing to ask it. 
2 
The State argues that "the multitude of questions posed 
by the trial court during voir dire provided ample insight into 
the jury pool to allow counsel to meaningfully evaluate each 
potential juror." State's brief at 21. The State not only fails 
to isolate any particular question asked by the trial court 
coming anywhere close to the content of question 27, but also 
fails to cite to the record.2 This shortcoming is likely 
explained by the fact that the record does not contain one 
question asked by the trial court which paralleled or substituted 
for question 27. 
Because the trial court failed to ask this requested 
question that would have provided meaningful assistance to Mr. 
Vigil in his exercise of peremptory and for cause challenges, or 
any question covering the substance of question 27, Mr. Vigil is 
entitled to a new trial. Worthen. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ASK QUESTION 28 
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In addressing the trial court's failure to ask question 
28,3 the State argues, again without citing to the record, that 
Such argument falls short of that legitimately 
expected and required of advocates appearing before this Court. 
See Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 
(Utah 1978)("This Court need not, and will not, consider any 
facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record."). 
3
 Question 28 inquired, 
Are there any of you who are not in such a fair 
and impartial state of mind that you would not be 
satisfied to have a juror possessing your mental state 
judge the evidence if you or your loved ones were on 
trial here? In other words, would you want someone 
with your state of mind sitting as a juror on this case 
3 
the overall voir dire was generally adequate to address the 
potential jurors' fairness and impartiality because the trial 
court asked the jurors several specific questions. State's brief 
at 21-22. 
While the trial court did ask several questions which 
may have elicited answers regarding specific biases addressed in 
the questions, the trial court did not ask one question as broad 
as question 28, which is designed to give the jurors the 
opportunity to reveal the biases or weaknesses that the jurors 
were aware of that the trial court and parties may not have 
anticipated in drafting specific questions. There were no 
questions asked that adequately substituted for question 28. 
The State indicates question 28 was covered in 
substance when the trial court stated, 
Members of the jury panel, let me also 
say to you that I hope by now certainly you 
have got the impression that it is going to 
be your responsibility to be fair and 
impartial to both sides of this particular 
lawsuit. 
State's brief at 22, quoting R. 701. 
This argument misunderstands the fundamentally 
inquisitive nature of voir dire. Voir dire is supposed to be a 
sensitive probing inquiry, to cull from the jurors blatant and 
latent biases. See e.g. State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844-856 
(Utah 1988). A trial court's admonition to prospective jurors 
trial here? In other words, would you want someone 
with your state of mind sitting as a juror on this case 
if you were the defendant? 
(R. 709). 
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that it is their responsibility to be fair and impartial is no 
substitute for a general question asking the jurors to reveal 
their known biases. Id. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO EXAMINE FURTHER THOSE 
POTENTIAL JURORS EXPOSED TO MEDIA COVERAGE 
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In response to Mr. Vigil's contention that the trial 
court committed reversible error in refusing to examine jurors 
Wylie and Reese in camera, the State argues that the voir dire of 
these jurors was adequate under State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201 
(Utah App. 1992). State's brief at 23-27. 
In Ontiveros, two prospective jurors who ended up 
serving on the jury were exposed to media coverage of Mr. 
Ontiveros' case. .Id. at 205. They could not remember any 
details, and the trial court asked three separate follow up 
questions to determine that the jurors would not be biased as a 
result of the media coverage. JEd. at 205. In affirming the 
trial court, this Court indicated that trial courts generally 
should conduct voir dire with an eye toward safeguarding the 
defendants' constitutional rights to fair trials, but found that 
in Mr. Ontiveros' case, the trial court's voir dire was adequate, 
and that further voir dire would have risked improperly exposing 
the jurors to facts about the case. Id. 
In contrast, the record in this case demonstrates that 
two jurors were exposed to media coverage of attempted adoptions, 
and indicates that both jurors recalled at least some details of 
5 
what they had seen and read.4 The trial court asked one of these 
jurors only one follow up question asking her to assess her own 
partiality,5 and did not obtain a straight answer from the other 
juror in asking her three follow-up questions. Comparison of 
4
 The State cites to pages 714-17 of the record, 
contending that the trial court "asked the potential jurors if 
they had been exposed to media accounts of adoption proceedings 
and questioned those jurors who indicated they had seen such 
stories, where they had seen them, what they remember about the 
stories, and whether they would be influenced by what they had 
seen or heard." State's brief at 27 n.4 f2. Pages 714 to 717 of 
the record do not support this representation, and are included 
in Appendix 1 to this brief. 
The record demonstrates that prospective juror Wylie had 
seen a program somewhere within six months prior to trial, and 
had read a magazine article about the subject (R. 715). The 
colloquy was as follows: 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this question, Ms. 
Wylie, As a result of the documentary or the article 
in the magazine, and considering the nature of today's 
case, would any of that information interfere with your 
responsibility to be fair and impartial? 
MS. WYLIE: No, not really. 
THE COURT: You are certain you could remain fair 
and impartial to both sides of this case? 
MS. WYLIE: I think, yes. 
THE COURT: Obviously, you use the word "think." 
Do you have a hesitation? 
MS. WYLIE: I don't remember the story in that 
detail, you know. I think I can listen impartially. 
(R. 715-716). 
Prospective juror Reese said that she had seen a show called 
"Attempted Adoption," wherein a "child was up for adoption and 
then their minds were changed and the natural parents got the 
child back." (R. 717). When the court asked,"Would any of that 
information interfere with your abilities to be fair and 
impartial to both sides of this lawsuit?" she answered, uNo."(R. 
717) . 
5
 This Court has previously recognized that it is the trial 
court's responsibility to craft specific and probing questions to 
assess juror bias, rather than to ask jurors to assess their own 
biases. E.g. State v. Woollev, 810 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
6 
this case to Ontiveros thus demonstrates that the trial court 
abused his discretion and that a new trial is in order. 
II. THE ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTION REQUIRES A NEW 
TRIAL. 
The State maintains that the trial court was correct in 
giving Jury Instruction 28.6 State's brief at 27-36. Where Mr. 
Vigil contends that there was no reliance and hence no theft by 
deception in the context of this case because the prospective 
adoptive parents by statute gave the Vigils money as a charitable 
contribution, knowing that they could not buy the Vigils' consent 
to the adoption, the State argues that theft by deception did 
occur, because in giving the Vigils the charitable contributions, 
the prospective adoptive couples relied on the Vigil's statements 
6
 Instruction No. 28 provided, 
Under Utah law, any person, agency, or corporation 
may pay maternity expenses, related medical or 
hospital, and necessary living expenses of the mother 
preceding and during confinement. However, that act of 
paying is by law considered an act of charity and may 
not be made for the purpose of inducing the mother, 
parent or legal guardian to place the child for 
adoption, consent to an adoption, or cooperate in the 
completion of an adoption. 
Whether a person consents to the adoption of his 
or her child is a personal and private act of that 
person and may not be bought or bartered for under the 
law. A natural parent at any time may choose not to 
consent to an adoption. By so choosing, that person 
does not subject himself or herself to criminal 
responsibility unless you find from the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the 
offense of Theft by Deception, as charged in the 
Informations have been established. 
(Emphasis added). 
As trial counsel noted, the instruction was incorrect in 
grafting a theft by deception exception onto the statute 
mandating that all monies given to birth piothers are charitable 
contributions, Utah Code Ann. section 76T7-203 (R. 1170-71) . 
7 
that they intended to give their baby up for adoption. State's 
brief at 30-31. 
Because this interpretation of the prospective adoptive 
parents' contributions renders the contributions conditional, it 
seems inconsistent with the law requiring the contributions to be 
charitable donations.7 
Assuming the State's argument to be correct, these 
facts still do not constitute theft by deception because all of 
the representations of the Vigils' intent to give their baby up 
for adoption had no pecuniary significance as a matter of fact or 
law. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (2)("Theft by deception does 
not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to matters 
having no pecuniary significance[.]"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-
203(proscribing the selling of children), supra, n 7. 
The State has not addressed this point anywhere in its 
brief. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-203 provides, 
Any person, while having custody, care, control, 
or possession of any child, who sells, or disposes of, 
or attempts to sell or dispose of, any child for and in 
consideration of the payment of money or other thing of 
value is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
However, this section does not prohibit any person, 
agency, or corporation from paying the actual and 
reasonable legal expenses, maternity expenses, related 
medical or hospital, and necessary living expenses of 
the mother preceding and during confinement as an act 
of charity, so long as payment is not made for the 
purpose of inducing the mother, parent, or legal 
guardian to place the child for adoption, consent to an 
adoption, or cooperate in the completion of an 
adoption. 
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Yet, the State concedes that trial counsel preserved 
their objection to Instruction 28. State's brief at 33. 
In instructing the jury that theft by deception can 
occur in the context of an adoption, Instruction 28 misstated the 
law. Given that the Instruction was the crux of the whole case, 
the Instruction was prejudicial to Mr. Vigil, and the conviction 
cannot stand. See State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 560 (Utah 
App.)("[B]eyond the substantive scope, correctness and clarity of 
the jury instructions, their precise wording and specificity is 
left to the sound discretion of the trial court.' However, said 
instructions must not incorrectly or misleadingly state material 
rules of law.")(citation omitted), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 
(Utah 1992). 
III. MR. VIGIL SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PRESENT HIS DEFENSE 
IN A NEW TRIAL. 
The State argues that the trial court correctly 
excluded the testimony of Rolland Oliver and in refusing the 
requested Jury Instructions8 because the testimony and 
The trial court refused to give the following two requested 
Instructions: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client will be directly adverse 
to another client, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not adversely affect the 
relationship with the other client; and 
(2) each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client may be materially limited 
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or 
to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, 
unless: 
9 
instructions were irrelevant. State's brief at 36-46. 
The State argues that Rolland Oliver's testimony and 
the Jury Instructions were irrelevant because they did not 
pertain to Mr. Vigil's criminal intent under the theft by 
deception statute. State's brief at 40-41, 45-46. 
Under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-401 and 405, the State was 
required to show that Mr. Vigil intentionally took the property 
of the prospective adoptive parents by means of intentional 
deceit. See State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah App. 
1994). In seeking to prove this, the State relied heavily on the 
fact that the Vigils were involved with three adoptive couples, 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not be adversely 
affected; and 
(2) the client consents after 
consultation. When representation of 
multiple clients in a single matter is 
undertaken, the consultation shall include 
explanation of the implications of the common 
representation and the advantages and risks 
involved. 
(R. 295). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business 
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an 
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 
interest adverse to a client unless: 
(1) the transaction and terms on which 
the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and 
reasonable to the client and are fully 
disclosed and transmitted in writing to the 
client in a manner which can be reasonably 
understood by the client[;] 
(2) the client is given a reasonable 
opportunity to seek the advi[c]e of 
independent counsel in the transaction [;] and 
(3) the client consents in writing 
thereto. 
(R. 296). 
10 
arguing that the Vigils acted with intentional deceit because 
they could not have honestly intended to give their baby up for 
adoption to three different couples (R. 1175; 1308). 
The essence of Mr. Vigil's defense was that he became 
involved with the three couples because of the inadequate 
services provided by the first two attorneys, Bushman and Giffen, 
and not because he intended to take the property by means of 
deceit (R. 1297-1301). Rolland Oliver's testimony would have 
explained norms of adoption proceedings, and thus elucidated the 
shortcomings of the attorneys' performance (R. 1151-1158). The 
Jury Instructions similarly would have clarified shortcomings in 
the attorneys' performance that the non-law-trained jury may 
otherwise have failed to appreciate. 
Because the evidence would have made less probable the 
State's assertion that the Vigils acted by means of deception or 
with the intent to deceive, the evidence was relevant under Utah 
Rules of Evidence 402. The Jury Instructions were relevant to 
the defense in the very same way. 
The State argues that the trial court properly excluded 
the evidence under Rule 403, because of the limited relevance of 
the evidence in the State's view, and the likelihood that the 
evidence would have misled the jury. State's brief at 42-43. In 
so arguing, the State does not contest the fact that the evidence 
was presumptively admissible. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1221-22 (Utah 1993). 
The State suggests that the evidence was properly 
11 
excluded because the presentation of the evidence would have 
required "a trial within a trial" concerning proper adoption 
proceedings, and cites State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268 (Utah 
App. 1996), for the proposition that the trial court was not 
acting "beyond the limits of reasonability" in excluding the 
evidence. State's brief at 43. 
Lindgren actually demonstrates that the trial court's 
exclusion of the evidence constitutes reversible error. The case 
recognizes that *[a] criminal defendant has the right to 
introduce evidence tending to disprove his or her specific intent 
to commit a crime [,] . . . even if it is not particularly 
strong." Id. at 1271. The Lindgren opinion demonstrates that 
unless the proffered evidence pertaining to specific intent is 
cumulative to other evidence presented, the trial court should 
admit the same, and may ameliorate any confusion of the issues 
for the jury by giving the jury limiting instructions. Id. at 
1273. 
Because Mr. Oliver's testimony was not cumulative to 
the evidence presented and was essential to Mr. Vigil's defense 
that he was involved with the three couples as a result of 
difficulties with the performance of the attorneys, rather than 
as a result of an intent to deceive, the Court committed 
reversible error in excluding the evidence. Id. 
The trial court's failure to give the Instructions 
embodying the theory of the defense also requires a new trial. 
State v. Ontiveros. 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 1992)(u[T]he 
12 
defendant has a right to have his or her theory of the case 
presented to the jury in a clear and comprehensible 
manner.")(citation omitted). 
IV- THE ABSENCE OF PROPER DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS 
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
The State does not contest Mr. Vigil's argument that 
the trial court should have instructed the jury that "Theft by 
deception does not occur ... when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-405(2). See page 35 of Mr. Vigil's opening brief. 
The State does not contest Mr. Vigil's argument that this 
omission was prejudicial error which should be addressed through 
the plain error and/or ineffective assistance of counsel 
doctrines. See Mr. Vigil's opening brief at 35-38. 
Mr. Vigil maintains that this error requires a new 
trial. 
In responding to Mr. Vigil's contention that the trial 
court should have instructed the jury in accordance with the good 
faith defenses codified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402,9 the State 
9
 Section 76-6-402 provides in relevant subpart, 
.... (3) It is a defense under this part that the 
actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right 
to the property or service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he 
had the right to obtain or exercise control 
over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over 
the property or service honestly believing 
that the owner, if present, would have 
consented. 
13 
contends that the trial court and trial counsel may have 
reasonably omitted this Instruction because it was inconsistent 
with the Vigils' defense that they had no intent to deceive the 
prospective adoptive parents, but were motivated to seek out new 
prospective adoptive parents because of difficulties with 
attorneys Bushman and Giffen. State's brief at 47-50. In 
support of this argument, the State speculates that trial counsel 
and the trial court may have been trying to avoid two nonsensical 
defense arguments created by the State in support of its position 
on appeal.10 
Rather than defeating the Vigils' defense, the good 
faith defenses provided by the statute complemented the defense. 
The argument presented by trial counsel was that because the 
Vigils were truthfully seeking out prospective adoptive parents 
in three successive couples, and had received legal advice that 
money provided by prospective adoptive couples was a charitable 
The hypothetical arguments appear on page 48 of the State's 
brief as follow: 
For instance, counsel may have determined that an 
argument under section 76-6-402(3) (a) might confuse the 
jury by implying defendant was arguing that even if 
defendant did knowingly or intentionally deceive the 
victims he nonetheless was justified in believing he 
was acting "under an honest claim of right." 
Similarly, counsel may have feared that an argument 
under subsection b would have implied that defendant 
believed that "he had the right to obtain or exercise 
control over the [victims'] property" even if he had to 
mislead the victims in order to get them to make a 
"charitable contribution" under section 76-7-203. 
14 
contribution, the Vigils accepted all of the money paid to them 
in good faith (R. 750-753; 1292-1307). Contrary to the 
hypothetical arguments created by the State, Mr. Vigil's defense 
never encompassed a concession that Mr. Vigil knowingly or 
intentionally deceived the prospective adoptive parents, or 
misled them. 
The failure to instruct the jury on the good faith 
defenses was prejudicial because there were no defense 
Instructions given. Given the evidence concerning legal advice 
to the Vigils that the money was considered a charitable 
contribution, and the evidence that the Vigils sought out 
additional prospective adoptive couples after having had 
difficulties with the first two adoption attorneys, the jurors 
may have acquitting the Vigils had they been informed of the good 
faith defenses provided by Utah law. 
Trial counsel's failure to request the Instructions on 
the absence of pecuniary significance and on the good faith 
defenses, as provided by statute, and the trial court's failure 
to instruct the jury in accordance with this law constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error, which this 
Court should address on appeal by granting Mr. Vigil a new trial. 
See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 
n.12 (Utah 1989); State v. Moritzky, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
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V. AS A MATTER OF LAW, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS CANNOT 
BE THE OBJECT OF THEFT BY DECEPTION. 
The State argues that a prospective adoptive couples' 
charitable contributions to the Vigils can be the object of theft 
by deception, because the prospective adoptive parents parted 
with their charitable contributions in reliance on the Vigils' 
deceitful representations that they intended to give up their 
child for adoption. State's brief at 28-32, 35-36. 
Because this interpretation of the prospective adoptive 
parents' contributions renders the contributions conditional, it 
seems inconsistent with the law requiring the contributions to be 
charitable donations.11 
Assuming arguendo that the State is correct, the 
charitable contributions still cannot be the object of theft by 
deception because the Vigils' representations that they intended 
to give up their child for adoption had no pecuniary 
significance. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(2)("Theft by 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-203 provides, 
Any person, while having custody, care, control, 
or possession of any child, who sells, or disposes of, 
or attempts to sell or dispose of, any child for and in 
consideration of the payment of money or other thing of 
value is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
However, this section does not prohibit any person, 
agency, or corporation from paying the actual and 
reasonable legal expenses, maternity expenses, related 
medical or hospital, and necessary living expenses of 
the mother preceding and during confinement as an act 
of charity, so long as payment is not made for the 
purpose of inducing the mother, parent, or legal 
guardian to place the child for adoption, consent to an 
adoption, or cooperate in the completion of an 
adoption. 
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deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as 
to matters having no pecuniary significance . . . " ) . 
Because the facts at issue here cannot constitute the 
crime of theft by deception under Utah law, this Court should 
order this case dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Vigil requests that this case be dismissed. In the 
alternative, he seeks a new trial, wherein the voir dire is 
adequate, the jury is instructed properly, and he is allowed to 
present his full defense. 
DATED this ^ day of April, 1996 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Mr. Vigil 
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APPENDIX I 
1 mistaken, there is a likelihood that this particular case 
2 received media exposure. What I would like to know at 
3 this particular time, and I will give you an opportunity 
4 to search your memory, members of the jury panel, whether 
5 or not any member of the jury panel recalls reading or 
6 seeing on television or hearing on the radio anything 
7 regarding this particular case? And if so, would you 
8 please just indicate this by raising your hand at this 
9 time. (Pause) The record may reflect that there are two 
10 hands raised: Ms. Floor has her hand raised and Ms. 
11 Anderson has her hand raised. Thank you very much, Ms. 
12 Floor and Ms. Anderson. 
13 Now, let me also ask somewhat of a related 
14 question, members of the jury panel. I would like to 
15 know at this time whether or not any member of the jury 
16 panel has seen any recent television programs or received 
17 any other information depicting attempted adoptions? Let 
18 me restate that. I would like to know whether any member 
19 of the panel has seen any recent television programs or 
20 received any other information depicting attempted 
21 adoptions. And if so, would you please indicate this by 
22 raising your hand at this time and keep those hands up 
23 there long enough for me so I can see who has their hand 
24 raised. Mr. Pepper has his hand raised and Ms. Wylie has 
25 her hand and Mr. Jerman has his hand raised. 
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1 And, Mr, Pepper, again, I might cut you off 
2 here. Identify for me what program you think you heard 
3 or saw. 
4 MR. PEPPER: It was one of the news magazine 
5 shows. 
6 THE COURT: How long ago? 
7 MR. PEPPER: Last week. 
8 THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Pepper. 
9 And, Ms. Wylie, what program was it? 
10 MS. WYLIE: I don't know. Just a documentary. 
11 THE COURT: How long ago was that? 
12 MS. WYLIE: Within six months and then in the 
13 Ladies Home Journal I think there was an article too. 
14 THE COURT: Do you recall the subject matter of 
15 the documentary or the article in the Ladies Home 
16 Journal? 
17 MS. WYLIE: I dust know its adoption and then 
18 they changed their mind. 
•19 THE COURT: Was that the subject matter of 
20 those issues? 
21 MS. WYLIE: Uh-huh. 
22 THE COURT: Let me ask you this question, Ms. 
23 Wylie. As a result of the documentary or the article in 
24 the magazine, and considering the nature of today's case, 
25 would any of that information interfere with your 
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1 responsibility to be fair and impartial? 
2 MS. WYLIE: No, not really. 
3 THE.COURT: You are certain you could remain 
4 fair and impartial to both sides of this case? 
5 MS. WYLIE: I think, yes. 
6 THE COURT: Obviously, you use the word 
7 "think." Do you have a hesitation? 
8 MS. WYLIE: I don't remember the story in that 
9 detail, you know. I think I can listen impartially. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. Wylie. 
11 Mr. Jerman, you had your hand raised. 
12 MR. JERMAN: Yes. 
13 THE COURT: What program was it, sir? 
14 MR. JERMAN: I am not sure. I can't recall 
15 whether it was a documentary or a news report. We have a 
16 place we stay in in Arizona occasionally. 
17 THE COURT: How long ago was it? 
18 MR. JERMAN: This winter. 
19 THE COURT: Was it an incident — Did it 
20 involve a situation in Arizona? 
21 MR. JERMAN: No, I thought it was a national. 
22 THE COURT: Would that exposure to that 
23 information prevent you from being fair and impartial to 
24 either side of this lawsuit? 
25 MR. JERMAN: No. 
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1 THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Jerman. 
2 The record may reflect that there is an additional hand 
3 raised. Just one second. Ms. Reese, you have your hand 
4 raised? 
5 MS. REESE: Yes. I watched a television 
6 program documentary within the last three months 
7 "Attempted Adoption." 
8 THE COURT: Do you remember the thrust or major 
9 points of the program you saw? 
10 MS. REESE: The major thing was that the child 
11 was up for adoption and then their minds were changed and 
12 the natural parents got the child back. 
13 THE COURT: Would any of that information 
14 interfere with your abilities to be fair and impartial to 
15 both sides of this lawsuit, Ms. Reese? 
16 MS. REESE: No. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Jones, Mr. Brown and Mr. 
18 Scowcroft, would the three of you approach the bench for 
19 a moment, please. 
20 (Off the record discussion between Court and 
21 counsel.) 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Jones, with the exception of 
23 the conversation we had at side bar, do you pass the 
24 panel for cause, sir? 
25 MR. JONES: Yes. 
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